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ABSTRACT: The present analysis defends the
thesis that Hegel elaborates an original
transformation of the concept of metaphysics,
assuming its presuppositions as they were
developed in the philosophic tradition, that
metaphysics is a doctrine of the first principles,
a theory of Being, a theodicy and even, as for
Kant, a theory of knowledge
KEYWORDS: Criticism; Metaphysics; Logic.
RESUMO: Este artigo defende a tese de que
Hegel apresenta uma transformação original do
conceito de metafísica, assumindo os
pressupostos tal qual foram desenvolvidos na
tradição filosófica, de que a metafísica é uma
doutrina dos primeiros princípios, uma teoria
do Ser, uma teodiceia, e, como também para
Kant, uma teoria do conhecimento.
PALAVRAS­CHAVE: criticismo; metafísica;
lógica.
The assumption that the book Science of Logic, from now on cited as SL, inHegel’s concept occupies the place which according to philosophic tradition
belongs to Metaphysics is a commonplace in Hegelforschung. To this follows the
postulate made by Hegel himself, already in some of his sketches from Jena, of
working out a Logic as Metaphysics.1
The programmatic perspective contained in this statement of a logic as
metaphysics, in general terms, was pursued by Hegel until the conclusion of his
fundamental work the Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der Logik].
In this way, the SL would be the heart and nucleus of power of the whole
system, which in some way would always refer to it. However, in the fortunes which
befell the reception, appropriation and comprehension of the SL and its relationship
with metaphysics, such an assumption, according to the perspective adopted in the
present paper, gave rise to the possibility of two interpretations: (i) a first way of
reading would allow the conclusion of the end of metaphysics and an opening for post­
metaphysical contexts. Such a reading can be found in authors as different as Heidegger
and Xavier Zubiri, for whom, with Hegel and through the proposal of the SL, the
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philosophy understood as metaphysics has reached its end.
In this first way of reading, which from now on will be called externalist,
occidental metaphysics found its exhaustion in the idea of the System, as in authors like
Richard Kroner, Gerard Lebrun, Klaus Hartmann, Robert Pippin und Robert Brandom,
each with his own specialities and interests, who promote and elaborate an in a certain
sense post­metaphysical way of reading of the SL.
A second group (ii), in an inversion, promotes a metaphysical reading of the SL,
denying the SL’s rupture with metaphysical tradition and pointing out its strings of
continuities, especially in Hegel’s understanding that the SL presents in the idea the
self­esplicitness of substance as subject. This perspective is adopted by authors like
Bernard Lakebrink, Bernard Bourgeois, Bernard Mabille, André Doz, among others.
This second way of reading will in the following be called internalist.
We are going to develop as central thesis, which binds together and answers to
the problem of the reception, critics and appropriation of metaphysics in the SL the
point of view of a transformation of metaphysics in Hegel’s SL.
To reach this aim, the argumentation in favor of making this thesis explicit will,
in the present text, develop through four vectors and moments: (i) exhibition of the
general lines of the interpretations mentioned above of externalists and internalists,
presenting their presuppositions and positive and negative points; after that, there will
be presented (ii) a preliminary concept of metaphysics, calling into mind the different
uses of the term metaphysics in the SL and the shifts in the traditional concepts of
metaphysics promoted by Hegel after the SL. Then (iii), with the help of the SL, will be
presented the limits of the internalist and externalist ways of reading, to at last (iv)
present and explain the transformation of metaphysics through an interpretation of the
SL as a metaphysics of its own.
(I) EXPOSITION OF THE GENERAL LINES OF READING BY EXTERNALISTS AND
INTERNALISTS MENTIONED ABOVE
The present research adopts the point of view that such ways of reading as
thematize the negation or continuation of metaphysics in Hegel’s project of The Science
of Logics divide, on the one hand, in externalists, for those who profess the SL a post­
metaphysical project, exactly for adopting definitions and starting points foreign to
Hegel’s thinking in general and the SL in particular.
Those interpretations, on the other hand, who situate the SL as pure metaphysics
and elaborate an exegesis extremely endogen to the SL and totally or nearly totally
outside the particular sciences in general and non­Hegelian philosophy itself in
particular, are called internalists.
The externlist interpretation can also be called relativistic, because in general it
assumes only a part or a passage of the SL, in a real pars pro toto. The internalist can be
called dogmatic, because it carries out the inverse procedure of toto pro pars,
neglecting the necessary dialogue of the whole with its parts and of philosophic talk
with the historical specifics of its own presentation.
The externalists can yet be divided into two groups. The first group of
externalists follows Kant’s way of thinking and includes Hegel in the transcendental
project of transforming and substituting metaphysics with epistemology2, while another
group, of strictly pragmatic orientation, admits the dissolution of metaphysics in
epistemology which anchors it, and promotes a second dissolution, this time of
epistemology itself. It emerges from her in the frames of a theory of inferential
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meaning, guide into some kind of categorical semantics of the first order3.
The present analysis defends the thesis that Hegel elaborates an original
transformation of the concept of metaphysics, assuming its presuppositions as they
were developed in the philosophic tradition, that metaphysics is a doctrine of the first
principles, a theory of Being, a theodicy and even, as for Kant, a theory of knowledge.
Not satisfied with these proposals, Hegel re­elaborates them in the light of his time and
of the scientific exigencies of his era. He presents The Science of Logic as an answer to
this new exigency on the metaphysical discourse. To understand this transformation, a
preliminary understanding of the object metaphysics is necessary.
(II) PRESENTATION OF A PRELIMINARY CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS
Hegel begins his SL, as soon as in the preface of the first edition, with an
imperious affirmation that metaphysics were pulled out at its roots4 and that it would
loose its relationship with the individual sciences, turning into an empty discourse
dislocated from reality. He further points out that this dislocation of metaphysics were
accompanied by a strange paradox: while philosophy had reached its highest grade of
self­awareness during the period known as German Classic Philosophy, there did not
exist at the same time any kind of progress in the studies about logic.
In proclaiming this exhaustion of metaphysics and the non­up­to­dateness of
logic in his time, Hegel elaborates his program of rescuing metaphysics as logic. He
points out the centrality of logic within philosophical discourse because of its necessary
relationship with reality and its conceptual translation5.
It is known that the exhaustion of metaphysics Hegel refers to had already been
denounced by Kant in his well known text about The Progress of Metaphysics from
Leibniz to Wolff6, and that the hypothesis of metaphysics in the context of Hegel’s
reflections has to take into account two types of relationship.
A first circle of relationships links the comprehension of metaphysics to the self­
production of the logical in reality or to the logical as self­determiner of the concrete
sciences, admitting to a point a certain totalizing tone of the elements internal to
philosophic discourse in the face of its connections expressive of the externals of the
world.
A second circle of relationships assumes a point of view which separates the
logical from reality, claiming an incapacity of logic in its totalitarian pretentions when it
is put into contact with the expressive capacity of the world.
The relationship between metaphysics and logic determines the understanding of
metaphysics itself in Hegel, and such a connection if P then Q, appears since his youth.
In Jena, Hegel advertizes his courses about Logic and Metaphysics, and he follows this
course into the structure of his system in its definite form, as it is presented in three
versions of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophic Sciences.
Hegel’s hyperboles about the capacity of Logic as a system and kingdom of pure
reason to be capable of reproducing itself in itself and the surrounding reality are more
than well­known. In his own words:
Die Logik ist sonach als das System der reinen Vernunft, als das Reich des reinen
Gedankens zu fassen. Dieses Reich ist die Wahrheit, wie sie ohne Hülle an und
für sich selbst ist. Man kann sich deswegen ausdrücken, daß dieser Inhalt die
Darstellung Gottes ist, wie er in seinem ewigen Wesen vor der Erschaffung der
Natur und eines endlichen Geistes ist.7
Throughout Hegel’s project and in all its versions there can be admitted a
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conditioning factor in the relationship between logic and metaphysics. In the terms
proposed by Franco Chiereghin, it divides in (a) a concept of negative dialectics
structured in terms of a logic as science of finite determinations that have to be
criticized and resolved, and (b) another concept of speculative logic as science of ideas,
in a dialectic positive and negative at the same time, constructivist8.
And it is this condition inherent to the development of Hegel’s own thinking
about the structuring relationship of the connection between logic and metaphysics
which is at the basis of his reception of the concept of traditional metaphysics, of his
criticism and of the transformation which this paper proposes as central in Hegel’s
project.
(III) THE LIMITS OF THE INTERNALIST AND EXTERNALIST INTERPRETATIONS OF
LOGIC AS METAPHYSICS
In the Logic of the Enzyklopädie in its § 249, Hegel enunciates the unity and
concurrence of Logic and Metaphysics, and in the Science of Logic he affirms that
Objective Logic has taken the place which traditionally belonged to the old
metaphysics.10
In the terms of what has been said before, it can be affirmed with security that
Hegel himself makes new proposals and structures the conditions for the existing
tension between the internalist interpretation, which advocates the self­sufficiency of
the Logic, and that of the externalists, for whom Logic suffers from a crisis of principle
for being divided between the Objective and the Subjective11, and that because of this
there exists a crisis in logic itself, which reveals it to be incapable to become effective
in reality.
In an original way, which in general terms and because of the conclusion it
reaches about Hegel’s metaphysical project can be counted among the externalists,
Michael Theunissen in his monumental Sein und Schein affirms that the supremacy that
Subjective Logic proposes to have over the Objective one, in the project of The Science
of Logic as criticism of ontology assumes the structure of a kind of schizophrenic link
which is ontologically inconceivable12.
The internalist ways of reading posses, all in all, the following insufficiencies:
they do not recognize experience as an important structuring and forming dimension of
concepts, put themselves into the imminence of a circular argumentation proposing
some kind of logical­metaphysical on an unconditioned basis, are excessively immanent
and build their discourse completely a priori.
There can also be added the criticism that the internalist interpretations do not
take Kant’s advice seriously that concepts without intuition are empty, in other words, a
strictly immanent reading loses its objective reference.
The externalist perspectives in their two versions find their limits put down by
Hegel himself, when he affirms that critical philosophy has also transformed
metaphysics into logic. They go wrong when they affirm that logic determinations are
essentially subjective13.
Putting in mind the continuing of Kant’s project in Hegel, the externalists
structure a framework of reality on the basis of a contingent conceptuality or, saying it
in Kant’s terms, in the blindness of intuitions without concepts.
We declare, therefore, that there is a methodological error in the understanding
of the reception, criticism and appropriation of the metaphysics in Hegel’s SL, as it is
generally realized by the Hegelforschung.
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To illustrate this error, we use Fichte, who, during the discussion about the status
and the meaning of his Doctrine of Science, called the attention of his compatriots to
the fact that”[…] all philosophic writing demands with reason of its reader that he
follow the strings of argument and does not forget anything that came before when he
arrives at what comes after”14.
Fichte demanded that in philosophizing, understood as thinking about what has
been thought, you cannot dislocate parts of the philosophic discourse as a way of
expliciting the spirit, or hold on to the literalness of the discourse about what was
thought, the letter, as the only source of your pretention to truth. Fichte demanded a
union between the immanence of the discourse and the transcendence of the spirit
inside the global context of the exhibition, so that justice could be done to any
philosophical discourse.
It seems to us that this could not be different with Hegel’s The Science of Logic.
(IV) THE TRANSFORMATION OF METAPHYSICS INTO A METAPHYSICS OF ITS OWN
IN THE SL
Hegel divided the Science of Logic in three parts, which were distributed in two
books. The first two parts refer to Being and Essence and thematize the topics which
traditionally belong to the ontological [old metaphysics] and transcendental
[metaphysics of subjectivity] metaphysical traditions, which are: (i) the understanding
of metaphysics as Ontology or doctrine of categories: quality, quantity, measure,
substance etc; (ii) the metaphysical reflection of the limits of a transcendental
metaphysics, in which categorical thinking deducts its underlying epistemology from
the movement of the criticism of thinking. From this Hegel promoted the first phase of
the reception, criticism and appropriation of metaphysics, that in which the relationship
between logic and metaphysics is structured according to the molds of a dialectic
metaphysics on negative bases.
In the book Of Subjective Logic, Hegel consumes the logical­metaphysical
themes of the first section for an elevation [Erhebung]. He re­structures the logical
patterns of reality’s metaphysical self­explanation and neither limits himself to an
internalist perspective of thinking, which professes its relationship only with its own
intrinsic determinations, nor does he admit only the externalist perspective, which
disqualifies global discourse of metaphysics and focuses only on the splits and
antinomies of the reflective activity.
In this new way of thinking which is inaugurated in The Doctrine of Concept,
philosophic reflection opens up to a new configuration of the understanding of logic as
metaphysics parting from the subjectivity of the idea, which is not merely subjective,
because the logical is itself the subject, not in psychological or transcendental terms, but
in the subjective unity of identity and non­identity.
Under the viewpoint of the transformation of metaphysics as metaphysics itself,
Hegel’s logic structures the formal conditions of contextualization of the set of his
systematic reflection without therewith pre­determining them. In this new philosophic
perspective of the role of logic, its contents will be determined parting from the formal
structures, without being already determined in the form of these same structures, in a
kind of logical­metaphysical metaconfiguration.
This character of a metaconfiguration implies that the transformation of
metaphysics contains the conditions that are necessary for logical thinking to be also
metaphysical meditation in a double sense: be it in its constructive bias, be it under the
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perspective of dissolution.
As synthesis, it can be affirmed that metaphysics itself is the science of the
integrality of the logical discourse as metaphysics of the Idea.
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1 Thinking here especially in the texts compiled by Georg Lasson under the title of Jenenser
Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie published by Felix Meiner.
2 Klaus Hartmann, Longuenesse, Pippin etc. generally follow this theory.
3 We are thinking here of Sellars, Robert Brandom, Terry Pinkard and J. McDowell.
4 Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, (translation indicated p. 7 [B.5, p. 16]) ,,Die völlige
Umänderung, welche die philosophische Denkweise seit etwa fünfundzwanzig Jahren
unter uns erlitten, der höhere Standpunkt, den das Selbstbewußtsein des Geistes in dieser
Zeitperiode über sich erreicht hat, hat bisher noch wenig Einfluß auf die Gestalt der Logik
gehabt. Dasjenige, was vor diesem Zeitraum Metaphysik hieß, ist sozusagen mit Stumpf
und Stiel ausgerottet worden und aus der Reihe der Wissenschaften verschwunden.“
5 The analysis developed in thie section lean on Emmanuel Renaut’s incendiary text, La
métaphysique entre Logique et Sciences Particulières, in Logique et Sciences Concrètes,
Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 13­32.
6 To understand the context of the forming of this debate and of the philosophical and categorical
determinations of the central proposition of this work, the book “La metafisica de Kant”
by Mario Caimi, published at EUDEBA in 1998, continues insuperable.
7 Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, (Translation indicated, p. 29 [B.5 ­ p.43]). In the translation of
George di Giovanni “This realm is truth unveiled, truth as it is in and for itself. It can
therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence
before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit”.
8 Franco Chiereghin, Possibilité de réalisation de la Logique et logicité du Réel : problemes et
apories, in Logique et Sciences Concrètes, Paris: L’Harmattan, p. 129 and following.
9 Hegel, Enz, § 24, [B.8 ­ p.80]) „Die Logik fällt daher mit der Metaphysik zusammen, der
Wissenschaft der Dinge in Gedanken gefaßt, welche dafür galten, die Wesenheiten der
Dinge auszudrücken“.
10 Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, (Engl. Transl. p. 42 [B.5 ­ p. 83]). Die objektive Logik tritt
damit vielmehr an die Stelle der vormaligen Metaphysik, als welche das
wissenschaftliche Gebäude über die Welt war, das nur durch Gedanken aufgeführt sein
sollte.
11 See especially Michael Theunissen.
12 Michael Theunissen. Sein und Schein. p. 392. “Das bedeutet es konkret, dass die
<subjective> Logik die in der <objectiven> kritisch dargestellte Ontologie aufhebt,
indem sie deren Wahrheit als eine solche enthüllt, die ontologisch unfassbar bleibt”.
13 Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, (Engl. Transl. p. 30 [B.5 ­ p.44]). „Die kritische Philosophie
machte zwar bereits die Metaphysik zur Logik, aber sie wie der spätere Idealismus gab,
wie vorhin erinnert worden, aus Angst vor dem Objekt den logischen Bestimmungen eine
wesentliche subjektive Bedeutung: dadurch blieben sie zugleich mit dem Objekte, das sie
flohen, behaftet, und ein Ding­an­sich, ein unendlicher Anstoß, blieb als ein Jenseits an
ihnen übrig.“
14 Fichte, The Doctrine of Science of 1794. Portuguese translation Rubens Rodrigues, p. 88.
